When liquidity providers for one asset obtain information from other asset prices, this may magnify the (upward or downward) comovement of asset liquidity. It also may yield an illiquidity multiplier (Cespa and Faoucault, 2014). We empirically test the magnitude of this illiquidity multiplier for a sample of U.S. equity real estate investment trusts (REITs) using spatial autoregressive models (Zhu and Milcheva, 2017) . We find significant liquidity spillovers among REITs with geographically overlapping real estate holdings. Our findings suggest that the multiplier effect impacts neighboring REITs through cross-asset learning about firm fundamentals. This effect is stronger during market turmoil, after the Decimalization (a source of exogenous variation), and for REITs headquartered in MSAs with less information asymmetry.
Introduction
Liquidity comovements can be significant determinants of asset pricing and market stability. Supply-side theories, such as funding liquidity constraints (Brunnermeier and Pedersen, 2009) , and demand-side theories, including correlated trading behavior (Kamara, Lou, and Sadka, 2008; Koch, Ruenzi, and Starks, 2016) , passive investment (Karolyi, Lee, and van Dijk, 2012) , and investor sentiment (Morck, Yeung, and Yu, 2000) can explain liquidity comovements. Cespa and Faoucault (2014) propose a new mechanism for examining liquidity comovements. They argue that in addition to funding liquidity constraints and correlated demand shocks, cross-asset learning -which generates a feedback loop and illiquidity multiplier -represents an important channel of liquidity spillovers.
A major focus of this paper is the liquidity risk factor for REITs, and how the risk factors of some REITs impact the risk factor of another particular REIT. What is the risk factor for REITs?
One candidate would be the risk that is specific to their underlying assets, commercial real estate (Hoesli, Kadilli, and Reka, 2017) . 1 The underlying real estate of REITs are transacted in the local property markets, which are highly segmented and are characterized by high transaction costs, long transaction duration, and asymmetric information (Garmaise and Moskowitz, 2004) . And the geography of property holdings is likely to contain private (soft) information of REIT managers regarding local property markets. Such private information is valuable to and presents profitable opportunities for equity investors (Cici, Corgel, and Gibson, 2011; Ling, Naranjo, and Schieck, 2017) . On the other hand, practitioners notice that many REITs tend to invest in overlapping local property markets. 2 Consistent with practitioner wisdom, we find that overlapping property holdings are likely to facilitate cross-asset learning, thereby increasing REITs' vulnerability to certain local shocks, such as shocks to top-10, and gateway, MSAs. Shocks to one or more REITs may propagate to the entire REIT market through liquidity spillovers.
How might one motivate liquidity spillovers? In the context of U.S. REITs, one might consider dealers in REIT A, who are well informed about A's risk factor. The REIT A dealers may learn information on the risk factor of another REIT (REIT B) from the price (or fundamentals) of REIT B. If the risk factor of REIT B raises its cost of liquidity provision, the price of REIT B may become less useful information to dealers in REIT A, thus increasing the risk factor of REIT A and the cost of its liquidity provision. Therefore, the price of REIT A can be a noisy signal for dealers in REIT B, which may amplify REIT B's illiquidity.
REITs are viewed as defensive investments, which reflect their underlying real estate.
However, recent research (Riddiough and Steiner, 2017) find that REITs' balance sheets are characterized by high debt usage, especially the use of unsecured debt, which might increase the lack of financial flexibility and thereby increasing REITs' vulnerability to market turmoil. The surge of REIT investment vehicles since the S&P 500 began including REITs and Decimalization 2 Seeking Alpha website wrote in June 7 th , 2016: "… over the last year Essex Property Trust (ESS) has adopted a strategy similar to Equity Residential (EQR), moving its portfolio closer to tenant desired features like Whole Foods Market". Also in this article "… we see value in comparing EQR to Essex Property Trust (NYSE: ESS) due to an increasing geographic overlap between the two REIT portfolios". in 2001, and recent classification of REITs as a separate asset class, are likely to enhance the cross-asset learning of REITs and increase the magnitude of liquidity multiplier.
Our paper contributes to the literature in several aspects. First, we empirically test the theoretical prediction of Cespa and Foucault (2014) with spatial econometrics tools. Unlike other publicly listed firms, 75% of REIT assets are required to be real estate related assets, which are location-specific. Therefore, instead of only relying on corporate headquarters as a proxy for firm location, we are able to utilize a comprehensive dataset of historical corporate headquarters locations and asset locations to facilitate a better understanding of firm geography.
Second, prior studies (Karolyi, Lee, and van Dijk, 2012; Luo, Xu, and Zurbruegg, 2017; Hoesli, Kadilli, and Reka, 2017) on liquidity commonality mostly rely on the 2 -measure, which ignores liquidity spillovers, or propagations of illiquidity risk, across different assets. We apply spatial econometrics techniques (as in Anselin, 1988) to model and measure the liquidity spillovers and the corresponding multiplier effect on the coefficients of liquidity fundamentals.
Our spatial lag coefficient (ρ) captures broader economic effects than the 2 -measure.
Third, we complement the findings of Zhu and Milcheva (2017) by showing that comovements of underlying real estate properties are important to the systemic risk of real estate companies -through the channel of liquidity spillovers. That is, a shock to the illiquidity of some REITs (i.e., shock, to gateway MSAs) might propagate to other REITs because of the informative nature of REITs price declines. The outcome may be market wide illiquidity and correlated equity returns.
Finally, our results complement the literature on asset liquidity and stock liquidity. We show that property market shocks reshape REIT liquidity through cross-asset learning. The illiquidity multiplier, which arises as an outcome of liquidity comovements, significantly magnifies the liquidity (or illiquidity) of REITs that have highly overlapping asset holdings.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: section 2 reviews existing literature; section 3 illustrates the construction of spatial lags and the mechanism of the liquidity multiplier; section 4 provides a discussion of the data and the construction of the variables; section 5 presents the empirical results and a discussion of those implications; and, section 6
concludes the paper and suggests future works.
Literature Review
Recent findings suggest that assets' liquidity vary with economic conditions and across geographic locations. Loughran and Schultz (2005) find that after adjusting for size and other factors, the shares of rural firms trade much less often than urban firms (i.e., firms located in the 10 largest MSAs in terms of total population). Their finding suggests that access to locality information and social factors can also affect cross-sectional liquidity. examine whether state-and MSA-level economic conditions affect the liquidity of stocks issued by local firms. And they find that liquidity of local stocks is positively associated with performance of the local economy.
Several studies have explored the mechanisms of liquidity commonality. 3 On the supply side, when there is a large loss on initial position and funding liquidity constraints of liquidity providers (i.e., margin goes up), the provision of liquidity across many securities falls and commonality increases (Brunnermeier and Pedersen, 2009; Glascock and Lu-Andrews, 2014; Jensen and Moorman, 2010; Naes et al., 2011) . On the demand side, correlated trading behavior (Kamara, Lou, and Sadka, 2008; Koch, Ruenzi, and Starks, 2016; Karolyi, Lee, and van Dijk, 2012) , passive investment (Morck, Yeung, and Yu, 2000) , and investor sentiment are all likely explanations for liquidity commonality. Luo, Xu, and Zurbruegg (2017) are the first to analyze the effect of home ownership on local liquidity commonality. They find that the effect of high home ownership significantly increases local liquidity commonality for less-liquid stocks.
One empirical challenge of examining firm-level price/liquidity spillovers is the measurement of firm location. The conventional finance literature has widely adopted corporate headquarters as firm locations because corporate headquarters are the center of information exchange between a firm and its suppliers, service providers, and investors (Davis and Henderson, 2008; Pirinsky and Wang, 2006) . However, recent papers have deviated from this argument by showing that the geography of underlying assets is also informative to investors (Bernile, Kumar, and Sulaeman, 2015; Landier, Nair, and Wulf, 2009 ). This evidence is especially true for REITs since the underlying real estate assets held by REITs are locationspecific, and acquisitions and dispositions might reveal strategic actions of REITs (Ling, Naranjo, and Schieck, 2017).
The most relevant works to our paper are Cespa and Foucault (2014) and Hoesli, Kadilli, and Reka (2017) . Cespa and Foucault (2014) lay the theoretical framework for the illiquidity multiplier. They express the liquidity multiplier as ≡ (1 − ∅) −1 , where 0 < ∅ < 1 and ≥ 1.
∅ is the magnitude of liquidity spillovers of asset j and the other assets -j. When the equilibrium is unique, idiosyncratic shocks to the illiquidity of asset j induce positive comovements in the illiquidity of both assets. As a result, the OLS estimation of the coefficient of liquidity fundamentals would underestimate the true (total) effect by a multiplier of . However, empirical calibration of remains a challenge. 4 Hoesli, Kadilli, and Reka (2017) empirically tested the asset pricing model of Acharya and Pedersen (2005) and find that commonality with the underlying property market represents a significant risk factor for REIT returns but the effect is time-varying and asymmetric -i.e., the effect only exists during market downturns. However, their results are based on the 2 measure, which assumes independence of the illiquidity of firms.
Spatial econometrics techniques have been employed to study the cross-section of asset returns (Zhu and Milcheva, 2017) and optimal capital usage (Wang, Glascock, and Cohen, 2017) . Zhu and Milcheva (2017) are among the first to explore the linkages between returns on listed real estate stocks (mainly REITs) and the location of the underlying assets, or the real estate properties. They show that the extent of spatial comovements across the underlying assets explain the cross-sectional variation of real estate abnormal returns and thereby contain 4 Cespa and Foucault (2014): "it would be interesting to measure empirically the strength of liquidity spillovers across asset classes… Another interesting issue is how the number of assets affects the amplification mechanism described in our paper and whether some assets are more pivotal for liquidity spillovers, because their prices are followed by more dealers or because their payoff structure makes them informative about a large number of assets" valuable price information. Wang, Cohen and Glascock (2017) focus on common stocks, and find that there is evidence of competition for scarce capital across U.S. states and MSAs; their study utilizes the spatial autoregressive model in estimating the extent of competition.
Spatial Autoregressive Model and Liquidity Multiplier
We use Spatial autoregressive model (hereby SAR model) to empirically examine the magnitude of liquidity spillovers proposed by Cespa and Faoucault (2014) . The SAR model is an approach to model the idea of spatial spillovers, where levels of the outcome variable y (i.e., liquidity of a particular REIT, in our case) may depend on the levels of y in neighboring geographic units, and other control variables. Within the context of liquidity spillovers, common
forms of a SAR model can be expressed as follows, respectively. 5
where Y represents an N×T by 1 vector of REIT-level Log(Amihud's illiquidity) and X represents an N×T by k matrix of liquidity fundamentals, where N is the number of REITs, T the number of time periods covered by the data, and k is the number of explanatory variables in the matrix X.
W is the N×T by N×T spatial weights matrix which captures commonality of underlying real estate properties. is a matrix of spatial lags, and it represents the weighted average of other jurisdictions' endogenous variable (Log(Amihud's illiquidity)). It has been shown (Kelejian and Prucha, 1998) that Equation (1) can be estimated by an instrumental variables techniques. 6
5 (Cohen, 2010) . 6 Also referered to as the Gershgorin's Theorem (Cohen, 2002) .
For Equation (1), is the appropriate instrument for itself, and is the instrument for .
The spatial coefficient parameter estimate, ̂, represents the magnitude of liquidity comovements.
To illustrate the spatial multiplier effect, consider a simplified example with only two REITs, Equity Residential (Ticker: EQR) and Essex Property Trust (Ticker: ESS), in one quarter, t.
Suppose X is the Market-to-book and Y is Log(Amihud's illiquidity). Then the two rows of observations in Equation (1) would be written as:
Based on these two equations, a 1% increase in − − leads to a % rise (if
) . But this change in
which this leads to another 2 % change in ( ℎ ' ) , and so on and so forth. This liquidity multiplier effect is just [1 + + 2 + 3 + ⋯ ] and assuming -1< <1, can be expressed as . Note that this expression is the same as ≡ (1 − ∅) −1 derived in Cespa and Foucault (2014) . It is straightforward to generalize this to the case involving multiple REITs.
Using the example from Column (2), 
Data
There are 156 REITs in our sample, and the time periods range from the first quarter of 1995 to the fourth quarter of 2014 (we have an unbalanced panel). Summary statistics are presented in Table 1 and variable definitions are in the Appendix. The pairwise correlations of dependent and independent variables are shown in Table 2 , with stars indicating statistical significance at the 1% level.
We use the natural logarithm of Amihud Illiquidity, Log(Amihud's illiquidity), to proxy for market liquidity of a particular REIT. Log(Amihud's illiquidity) is computed as the logarithm of the average of quarterly average of absolute daily return to the product of absolute daily price and daily volume.
Specifically, for individual REIT i in quarter q, with better firm performance and less uncertainty, thereby improving REIT liquidity.
Empirical Results

Spatial Weights Matrix
We perform our analysis using a sample of 156 U.S.-based REITs from 1995 through 2014. Our spatial weights matrix is constructed following a similar approach to Zhu and Milcheva (2017 Figure 2 . Then the first step would be to generate 150,648 observations (299×252+251×300, since EQR has 300 locations including its headquarters, and ESS has 252 including its headquarters).
In the second step, we aggregate across the distances for property l of firm i in year t.
Specifically, for property l of firm i in year t, the aggregated distance is expressed as the minimum of distances calculated in the first step,
and the same holds for property k of REIT j in year t. Continuing from our previous example, after the second step, we would expect 550 observations (299+251).
In order to convert the aggregated distances into contiguity matrices, we calculate the proportion of properties of firm i that are regarded as 'neighbors' to firm j, and vice versa. The benchmark we choose for a neighbor is within 25 kilometers. The outcome can be viewed as the extent of geographic overlap of assets held by firm i and j.
We first construct a dummy variable that indicates whether or not property l of firm i is less than 25 kilometers away from at least one of the properties held by firm j or firm j's headquarters.
, , , = { 1, , , , ≤ 25 km and ≠ 0, ℎ
then we calculate the proportion of properties of firm i that are regarded as `neighbors' to firm j and vice versa,
where is the total number of properties held by firm i in year t. Finally, the spatial weights for firm i and firm j is:
, , = min ( , , , , , , , )
In our previous example, most of EQR's property holdings are in major metropolitan areas (e.g. Boston, New York, Washington, D.C., Seattle, San Francisco, Los Angeles, San Diego) 
Spatial Autoregressive Model Estimations
Insert Figure 1 -Time-series trend of spatial coefficients
For each year, we estimate the following cross-sectional IV regression: 
where the spatial coefficient, , is the coefficient of interest for liquidity spillovers. In other words, it is the coefficient estimate on the spatial lags of the dependent variable (Log(Amihud's illiquidity)). We plot for each year in Financial Crisis, and 2011 European Sovereign Debt Crisis.
Table 3 -Firm-level spatial analysis of REIT liquidity -Columns (1) and (2)
In where the spatial coefficient, ρ, is the coefficient of interest for liquidity spillovers. Equation (10) and (11) are IV estimations based on an unbalanced panel dataset. To control for crosssectional and time-series heterogeneity, we include REIT/major property type fixed effects and quarter fixed effects. We also cluster standard errors at REIT level.
All else being equal, we find significant market liquidity comovements among REITs with highly overlapping property holdings. In Column (1) and (2), the coefficient on the fitted spatial lags of Log(Amihud's illiquidity), ρ, is positive and significant, indicating enhanced cross-asset learning (knowledge spillovers) of REITs with similar fundamental characteristics. This positive spillover effect is robust to the inclusion of firm/property-type fixed effects with time dummies.
As we illustrated above, the spatial multiplier effect on coefficient estimates is increasing the illiquidity of a REIT. In our analysis of REITs, higher asset liquidity appears to be associated with higher illiquidity. 
The difference between the pair of equations (12) and (13) and the pair of equations (10) and (11) is that in the former pair, we include interactions between the spatial lags of Log(Amihud's illiquidity) and independent variables and Urban REIT, Gateway REIT, or High home conc. We include interactions to examine how liquidity spillovers respond to crosssectional variations in an information environment.
Prior studies (e.g. Ling, Naranjo, and Schieck, 2017; Loughran and Schultz, 2005) suggest that firms headquartered in top-10/gateway MSAs have higher stock liquidity measures because they enjoy a better information environment than the other firms. Consistent with the prior literature, we find that the positive spillover effect is larger for REITs located in top-10/gateway MSAs. We also find that REITs with a majority of their property holdings concentrated close to their headquarters are significant contributors to liquidity spillovers.
Table 4 -Pre-and Post-Decimalization (April 2001)
To identify that the positive spillover effect is driven by cross-asset learning, we use Decimalization in April 2001 as a source of exogenous variation in information environment of REITs . 8 The model setup is the same as Equations (10) and (11). The cutoff date is the Decimalization, which significantly improved the information environment, thereby enhancing cross-asset learning. Therefore, we expect the liquidity spillover effect to be larger following the completion of the Decimalization. Consistent with our prediction, the magnitude of the spatial coefficient (0.25) is more than doubled in the post-Decimalization period, compared to that of Column 1, Table 3 (0.12). Consistent with Table 3 , underestimation of coefficient estimates only exists after the Decimalization.
8 Investopedia wrote: "The U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) ordered all stock markets within the U.S. to convert to decimalization by April 9, 2001, and all price quotes since appear in the decimal trading format… The switch was made to decimalization to conform to standard international practices and to make it easier for investors to interpret and react to changing price quotes".
Conclusions
We examine the liquidity spillovers of REITs due to geographically overlapping property holdings. Consistent with Cespa and Foucault (2014) 's prediction, we find that cross-asset learning is an important channel of REIT liquidity spillovers. We find that idiosyncratic shocks to the liquidity fundamentals propagate to other REITs through cross-asset learning. Such liquidity spillovers magnify the comovements of REIT liquidity by generating a multiplier effect on the coefficient estimates of liquidity fundamentals. This underscores the importance of using spatial modeling to avoid downward biased estimates of liquidity fundamentals on REIT liquidity. Our findings show that liquidity spillovers are stronger among REITs headquartered in top-10 and gateway MSAs, hold greater proportion of underlying real estate close to their headquarters, after S&P 500 index inclusion, and during market turmoil. Our results indicate that cross-asset learning about property-level private (soft) information, which is captured by the degree of commonality in the underlying real estate, shapes the market liquidity of REITs at firm level. We adopt different definitions and cutoff points from Gupta, Kokas, and Michaelides (2017) and Zhu and Milcheva (2017) for our spatial weights matrix to check the robustness of our results. We also find that the Decimalization introduced exogenous variation in the information environment of the U.S. equity markets, which in turn strengthened cross-asset learning and enhanced the liquidity spillovers among REITs. 
Compustat Snapshot
Home concentration Ratio of the total adjusted cost of all properties owned by the REIT in its home MSA to the total number across all MSAs.
SNL Financial
High home conc An indicator variable which equals to 1 if the Home concentration of a REIT is above sample median in a particular year, and 0 otherwise.
REIT-level variables OP REIT i has Umbrella Partnership REIT (UPREIT) or DownREIT status (Hartzell, Sun, and Titman, 2014) .
SNL Financial Adjusted Cost
The maximum of (1) 
